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While institutional differences have been found to affect country growth patterns, much 
has remained unexplained, including how economic actors “overcome” institutional 
weaknesses and how internationalization helps or hinders development. Banking is an 
institutionally-intensive activity and the location decision of foreign banks provides a 
good test of how institutional differences are dealt with. Specifically, we examine 
whether banks seek out those markets where institutional familiarity provides them with a 
competitive advantage over other foreign competitor banks. Using bilateral data on 
banking sector FDI in all developing countries and controlling for other factors, we find 
that competitive advantage is important in driving foreign banks’ location decisions. The 
findings suggest that high institutional quality is not necessarily a prerequisite to be able 
to attract foreign direct investment in banking and that there are specific benefits, as well 
as risks, to international financial integration between developing countries.  
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1.   Introduction 
The last decade has seen many foreign banks entering other markets, especially in 
developing countries. This has been driven by globalization and increased financial 
integration. As for other foreign investment entry decisions, individual banks have to 
weigh the costs and risks to enter foreign markets against the opportunities at home and 
against other modalities to provide financial services across borders, such as through 
cross-border lending. Furthermore, foreign banks have many markets to choose from 
when entering to provide a broad range of financial services. This leads to the questions 
about what factors affect the decision of a bank to go abroad and enter a specific country. 
In the literature several factors have been identified.   
Traditionally the internationalization of banks has been closely tied to the 
internationalization of non-financial firms; in other words, banks follow their customers 
to provide them with financial services abroad and thereby increase their business. Some 
studies have indeed shown that foreign direct investment in banking is correlated with the 
degree of bilateral trade and FDI between the source and the host country (Grosse and 
Goldberg, 1991, Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996, Williams, 1998, and Yamori, 1998). 
However, the provision of trade-related finance has tended to become less important. 
Instead, banks are increasingly providing non-trade-related financial services across 
borders, without needing to establish affiliates in foreign markets.  Furthermore, firms 
can increasingly obtain trade finance from local banks. 
Banks engage in foreign entry presumably also to increase the bank’s 
profitability, within an acceptable risk profile and risk diversification goals.  Indeed, host 
and source country characteristics related to profitability and risks have been found to be 
important drivers of banks’ decision to penetrate a foreign market. Focarelli and Pozzolo 
(2000), for example, find that banks prefer to have subsidiaries in countries where 
expected profits are larger, because of higher expected economic growth and the prospect 
of benefiting from local banks’ inefficiencies. And Galindo, Micco, and Serra (2003) find 
that foreign bank penetration is significantly higher between countries that have similar 
legal origins, banking regulations and institutional set ups, presumably as costs of 
operating and risks are lower in such countries.    2
Here, we argue that a bank’s competitive advantage due to familiarity with 
working in a certain investment climate can be another important determinant of foreign 
bank entry. In the general FDI literature, the internalization theory has been developed to 
explain why and how firms expand abroad. The theory asserts that firms expand abroad 
to exploit the knowledge advantage created within the firm. The concept of internal 
knowledge used is a very broad one and includes technical know-how, marketing know-
how and managerial know-how (see Casson, 1987). To benefit most of this internal 
knowledge-advantage, firms are best off to expand to an environment that is most equal 
to the environment they are already familiar with (as the skills they are internalizing are 
better suited to do business in a similar climate) (Buckley and Casson, 1991).   
For banks, the concept of internal knowledge has mostly been used in respect to 
information asymmetries and principal agent issues.  It has been established, theoretical 
and empirically, that banks can derive informational advantages from long-term bank-
client relationships (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and Rajan, 1998).  This can allow 
banks to offer their customers informational-intensive financial services at better terms 
than other banks and anonymous financial markets may. More generally, and in terms of 
explaining why and how banks expand abroad, the internalization theory would suggest 
that banks enter countries with similar level of information intensity and, more generally, 
similar institutional environments. So, a bank used to work in an opaque institutional 
environment, might be better able to exploit its knowledge advantage in a country which 
is also opaque. Vice-versa for a bank that is used to working in a very transparent country 
without corruption, other things being equal, it would be suboptimal to expand to a 
country with much opaqueness and a high level of corruption.
1 This would suggest that 
institutional differences limit the expansion of banks’ activities across borders. This 
hypothesis is supported by the empirical work of Galindo et al. (2003), who find that 
foreign bank penetration is greater between source and host countries that have more 
legal and institutional similarities.  
                                                 
1 This argument is supported by evidence that large and small banks operate differently. There is evidence, 
for example, for the U.S. that small banks are better than large banks in lending to SMEs, which are 
informationally more opaque, as large banks rely more on hard information to do their lending.  Since 
consolidation of the US banking system has led to a greater distance, it has thereby led to less lending to the 
more soft-information intensive SMEs (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005).   3
The above argument implicitly assumes that the location decision of an individual 
bank is made independent of the location decision made by other, competing, 
multinational banks that are also expanding their business abroad and want to determine 
their choice of location. When a firm decides to expand its business abroad, however, the 
choice of location is not just dependent on the firm’s own internal advantage, but also on 
the competitive advantage that the investing firm has both over domestic firms but also 
over other foreign firms. To the extent that sources of internal competitive advantages are 
derived from the ability to work within a certain institutional environment, this implies 
that it may not just be the difference between the institutional quality in host and source 
country that matters for location decisions, but rather the difference between host and 
source country taking into account the institutional quality of the competitors. The impact 
of this type of competitiveness on location attractiveness of any type of foreign 
investment has, to our knowledge, not been studied before.  The location decision of 
foreign banks, an institutionally-intensive sector, provides a good test how institutional 
differences can lead to competitive advantages and how they maybe dealt with.   
In our study, we test therefore whether competitive advantage arising from 
working in a certain investment climate is an important determinant of foreign bank 
entry. In order to do so, we first construct a database covering most banks in all 
developing countries, including their ownership and the source country of all foreign 
owners. This database allows us to test whether better knowledge about a certain business 
environment compared to a bank’s competitors is a determining factor in its decision to 
enter a certain market.  We next construct a measure of a bank’s competitive advantage 
as it relates to institutional environments. We find that controlling for a large number of 
variables already established to determine bank entry, the level of institutional 
development in the host country itself does not seem to impact cross-border entry 
activity. The same holds for differences in institutional development between host and 
source countries. However, we find strong evidence that similarities in institutions 
between host and source country compared to competitors affect a bank’s entry decision. 
In other words, it is not the absolute level of the institutional environment faced by a firm 
that prevents it from entering a certain market, but rather its ability to work within a 
certain institutional environment better than its competitors. This shows that competitive   4
advantage related to institutional environment is indeed an important driving factor in 
entry decisions made by foreign banks.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
database used for foreign bank entry and show some statistics that indicate the potential 
importance of competitive advantage. In Section 3 we describe the methodology used and 
Section 4 includes the results. The last section concludes.  
 
2.   Data and importance of competitive advantage  
 
Bank Entry Data   
To test our hypothesis whether the location decision of foreign banks is driven by 
competitive advantage, we need to construct a database that contains information on both 
the host country of FDI as well as the source country of ownership. Our primary source 
of information is Bankscope. This is an international data set of balance-sheet items and 
ownership information of individual banks. All the main information on assets and 
liabilities and revenues is reported according to a common standard which is comparable 
across countries. The coverage is comprehensive, with banks included roughly 
accounting for 90 percent of the assets of banks in each country.  
Foreign presence in the banking sector is highly concentrated among developed 
countries, which share almost similar levels of institutional quality. This presence also 
often dates back from entry long ago.  To test our competitive advantage hypothesis we 
need variation in institutional quality between the possible host countries a foreign bank 
can choose from. Furthermore, we want to study entry decisions⎯rather than presence, 
which have been more intense in the last decade for developing countries than for 
developed countries.  For these two reasons, we limit our sample to foreign bank entry in 
developing countries. The source countries in our sample include of course both 
developed and developing countries. 
Countries with less than five active banks in Bankscope are excluded from our 
sample. A few developing countries are offshore centers (Barbados, Lebanon, Mauritius, 
and Panama). As decisions to enter those markets are often driven by tax incentives we 
exclude these countries from our sample. Information on ownership for banks located in   5
Guatemala is very limited, so we also excluded this country. These restrictions leave us 
with a total of 98 developing countries. This sample includes both low and middle-
income developing countries, providing a wide variety in income levels and, as such, 
institutional quality. Furthermore, it includes host countries from all regions, making it 
possible to control for regional differences.  
Our sample includes all active commercial banks, saving banks, cooperative 
banks, bank holding companies and middle and long term credit banks that are reporting 
to Bankscope at end 2005. We assume a bank is foreign owned if 50 percent or more of 
the shares of a bank is owned by foreigners. The source country of the foreign owner is 
determined by looking at the direct shareholder structure. The percentages of shares are 
summed by country of residence of the shareholder. The country with the highest 
percentage of shares is appointed as the source country. When ownership information is 
not available in Bankscope, information is gathered from banks’ websites or other 
internet sources. Ownership data are based on information available as of end 2005. We 
have ownership information for 2,297 banks, of which 35 percent are foreign owned.  
 
Preliminary evidence 
If our competitive advantage hypothesis is correct we should find that, taking the 
behavior of competitors into account, banks that work in countries with high levels of 
institutional quality tend to go to developing countries with relative high or average 
levels of institutional quality. On the other hand, banks headquartered in countries with 
weak institutions will tend to go to developing countries on the lower end of the 
institutional quality scale. So, when looking at the relationship between institutional 
quality in host and source country, a positive correlation should exist. The scatter plots 
presented in Figure 1 show that this is indeed the case. 
Figure 1 displays six scatter plots. In each one, a measure of institutional quality 
in the host country is plot against the same indicator of the source country when at least 
one bank from the source country entered the host country. As measures of institutional 
quality we use the governance indicators constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2005). These indicators measure six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political instability and violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4)   6
regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption. For each dimension they 
created an index that ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating a lower 
burden. These measures have often been used in the literature to determine the impact of 
institutional quality on the location of FDI in general and FDI in banking in particular 
(see, for example, Galindo et al., 2003 and Stein and Daude, 2004).  
All relationships displayed in Figure 1 are positive and highly significant.
2 If 
absolute differences were driving entry decisions, we would expect a scatter around the 
45 degree line, but this is not what we find in the plots. In other words, the positive 
correlation between institutional quality in host and source country does not seem to be 
driven by minimizing absolute differences and provides some preliminary evidence that 
competitive advantage might play a role in the location decisions of banks. 
The study of Van Horen (2006) also provides some indication of the importance 
of competitive advantage in location decisions. This study finds that foreign bank 
ownership by banks from developing countries is more significant in low-income than in 
middle-income countries, while banks headquartered in a rich country are more strongly 
represented in middle income developing countries. The fact that foreign banks in 
developing countries are mostly from middle income developing countries suggests that 
competitive advantage over foreign competitors may be important in location decisions. 
By being more familiar⎯as compared to banks from rich, developed countries⎯with the 
more challenging investment climate in developing countries, banks from middle-income 
countries may have a competitive advantage over foreign competitors in low-income 
countries. Vice-versa, for banks from high-income countries, it may be easier to operate 
in middle-income countries. If similarity in institutional quality mattered most for banks’ 
entry, instead of competitive advantage, banks from middle-income countries would 





                                                 
2 The individual indicators are based on their value in 2000. However, correlations are very similar when 
taking the values for different years.    7
3.   Hypothesis formulation and empirical methodology 
 
In this section we test formally whether competitive advantage over foreign competitors 
impacts location decisions of multinational banks.  This is summarized in our 
“competitive advantage” hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Banks that are used to working in a country with relatively weak institutions 
compared to their competitors will expand to countries with relatively weak 
institutions, while banks that are more familiar with working in a country 
where institutions are well-functioning compared to their competitors will 
tend to enter countries with relatively good institutions.  
 
The scatter plots presented in the previous section provide obviously only a very rough 
indication of the impact of competitive advantage on location decisions. First, if 
similarity in host and source countries’ institutional environment would explain the 
location decision of firms, the correlations shown in the previous section should also be 
positive. In other words, to determine whether it is indeed competitive advantage due to 
familiarity with the environment that explains location decisions, one needs to construct a 
variable that takes the quality of institutions of the host and source country, but also that 
of the competitors into account. Second, there are a number of variables that may affect 
the location decision, which need to be controlled for. In this section, we will therefore 
develop a formal measure of competitive advantage and estimate a gravity model of 
bilateral FDI in banking, to determine whether indeed competitive advantage explains the 
location decision of foreign banks, in addition to the normal control variables.  
 
Measure of foreign bank presence 
In order to determine the impact of competitive advantage on the spread of foreign banks 
across countries, we need to use bilateral data. As described above, our data include 98 
host countries and for all foreign banks in those countries, we determine the country of 
residence of the owner, or the so-called source country. For each host country, we 
construct country-pairs with all possible source countries in the sample. We restrict the   8
source countries to all developed and developing countries that have a presence in the 
banking sector of at least one developing country. This to avoid a bias in the estimation 
due to the fact that some potential source countries might have capital account 
restrictions or other economic or institutional factors that make it impossible for their 
banks to expand to other countries and for which we cannot easily control. In addition 
source countries that are offshore centers are excluded. This leaves us with a total of 
6,382 country-pair observations.  
Following Galindo et al. (2003), we use as the dependent variable a measure of 
overall foreign bank penetration. For each host country, we determine per source country 
the sum of assets of foreign owned banks and divide that by the total amount of banks’ 




Measure of competitive advantage 
Our hypothesis implies that firms that are more familiar with working in a country where 
institutions are weak compared to their competitors will tend to invest in host countries 
with weak institutions. At the same time, firms whose home country has strong 
institutions are more likely to go to countries with good institutions as they have a hard 
time competing in host countries with weak institutions. To model this, we interact the 
institutional quality in the host country with the difference between the institutional 
quality in the source country and that of all the bank’s competitors. In other words, 
competitive advantage that a source country j has in host country i is defined as:  
 
) ( Instcomp Instsource Insthost CompAdv j i ij − =  
 
The institutional quality of the competitors, Instcomp, is measured by taking the 
weighted average of the institutional quality in each of the possible source countries. The 
weight of each country is determined by its size, proxied by its dollar GDP. The measure 
of competitive advantage can be positive or negative, depending on whether in terms of 
                                                 
3 In order to minimize the effects of particular events, data on banks’ assets are averages of annual values 
from 2000-2004.   9
institutional quality the source country is above of below the average of competitor 
countries.  
Our specific measure of institutional quality in the host country is the simple 
average of the six governance indicators identified by Kaufmann et al. (2005) discussed 
in the previous section. Although, taking the simple average can hide certain indicator-
specific effects on foreign bank entry, we believe this bias is limited as correlation 
between the six indicators is very high, ranging from 0.60 to 0.96. However, in a 
robustness test, we test whether our results are different when using the individual 
indicators. The original indicators of Kaufmann et al. (2005) vary between -2.5 and 2.5, 
which makes it harder to interpret the results. To avoid this, before constructing the 
competitive advantage variable, we linearly transform the original indicators so their 
value is never below zero. Data for 2000 are used to minimize bias in the estimation due 
to endogeneity, e.g., foreign entry raising the institutional quality of the host country. 
A positive sign of the competitive advantage variable would suggest that if the 
institutions of the source country are better than that of its competitors, good institutions 
in the host country have a positive impact on foreign bank entry. If, on the other hand, the 
institutions in the source country are weak relative to that of the competitors, banks from 
this country will be more inclined to locate in countries with weak institutions. In other 
words, for our competitive advantage hypothesis to hold the variable should be 
significant and have a positive sign.  
 
Empirical framework 
In order to explain FDI in the banking sector of developing countries, we use a gravity 
model. The gravity model has been used extensively to explain trade patterns.  Recently 
the gravity model has been applied more frequently in studies on explaining FDI (see, 
among others, Galindo et al, 2003, Di Giovanni, 2005, and Van Horen, 2006). The model 
in its most simple format explains bilateral flows (i.e., trade or investment) between two 
countries on the basis of the product of the GDPs of both countries, and the distance 
between them. The model is typically extended by including dummies that indicate 
whether the two countries share a common border, common language, past colonial links, 
possibly time-zone and other geographical information etc.    10
To test our competitive advantage hypothesis, we estimate how the size of 
foreign-controlled assets from source country j in host country i is related to institutional 
quality in the host country and to our measure of competitive advantage. If our 
hypothesis is correct, the quality of institutions in the host country should not matter. 
After all, when facing a decision to enter another country, banks from certain countries 
will be attracted to countries with well-functioning institutions while others by countries 
with weak institutions depending on the quality of institutions in their home country. At 
the same time the relative level of institutional quality should be significant and have a 
positive sign.  
We first include standard gravity model variables like common border, common 
language, past colonial links and distance between the countries, and GDP of host and 
source country. These variables have proven to have explanatory power as drivers of 
foreign bank entry (see Galindo et al., 2003). Furthermore, we include trade between the 
two countries and a dummy that captures whether the legal systems of the countries are 
from the same origin.
4  In addition, we include a measure of the financial depth of the 
host country and a dummy that captures whether foreign bank entry is restricted in the 
host country. To capture differences in the magnitude of foreign bank entry in different 
regions of the developing world, we also include regional dummies. We did not use 
country dummies to capture source country specific effects. Since FDI takes only place in 
a small portion of our country pairs, adding source country dummies could potentially 
create a bias in our estimations. To capture some of the source country characteristics that 
could explain the decision to enter a foreign market, we include, besides the size of the 
source country economy also its GDP per capita. To limit the possibility that our results 
are affected by endogeneity, we use for all explanatory variables that are time-varying 
only their levels in 2000. For a complete description of all variables in the model, see the 
appendix.  
Our benchmark model is as follows:  
 
                                                 
4 Another useful indicator would be bilateral FDI flows, but data are not available, and FDI flows are 
highly correlated with trade flows, which is included in the model.   11
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where i refers to the host country and j to the source country. We estimate our gravity 
model using Tobit to account for the many zeros in the dependent variable. In addition, 
the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, 
 
4.   Results 
 
Does competitive advantage matter? 
Using regression model (1) we test whether familiarity with the type of business climate 
relative to its competitors, matters in a bank’s decision which country to enter. Before 
turning to the regression results, we first estimate the model excluding the competitive 
advantage variable but including the measure of institutional quality in the host country 
and the absolute difference between institutional quality in the host and source country 
respectively. The latter variable is constructed by taking the simple average of the 
absolute difference of each of the six governance indicators.  
Table 1 presents the results. To aid the economic interpretation we show, instead 
of parameter estimates, the marginal effects of the unconditional expected value of the 
dependent variable, E(y), where y=max(a, min(y*,b)) where a is the lower limit for left 
censoring (0) and b is the upper limit for right censoring (100). The marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of the independent variable, except when the independent variable 
is a dummy in which case the marginal effect is calculated as the change in the dummy 
variable from 0 to 1. The marginal effects capture the combined effect of the impact of 
the explanatory variable on the probability of entering the host country as well as on the 
amount of FDI.  The mean of the dependent variable is equal to 0.57 percent.  
The first two columns in the table show that both institutional quality of the host 
country as well as the difference in institutional quality have no statistically significant 
impact on cross-border banking activity. In fact, the variable capturing differences in 
institutional quality has a, counterintuitive, positive sign, although not statistically   12
significant. These results would suggest that the average bank expanding abroad does not 
consider the institutional quality of the host country in which it wants to invest. However, 
these results do not consider the possibility that banks that want to expand abroad might 
have different reactions to the level of institutions in the host country.  
As is shown in the third column of Table 1, we indeed find that institutional 
quality matters in a bank’s entry decision, but differently for banks located in different 
countries. As in the first regression, we find that institutional quality of the host country 
is insignificant. However, we find that our competitive advantage variable is positive and 
highly significant, suggesting support for the competitive advantage hypothesis. The 
result suggests that for banks which, compared to their competitors, come from countries 
with good institutions, a high institutional quality in the host country will make it more 
likely that they engage in cross-border banking. On the other hand, for banks that are 
familiar in working in a country where institutions are weak, a better institutional quality 
will be a deterrent for cross-border banking.  
The impact of competitive advantage on foreign bank presence is economically 
very relevant and the results show the opposite effects of institutional quality between 
high and low institutional quality source countries. The parameter estimate, which 
reflects the marginal effect, can be interpreted as follows: for the source country that has 
the highest level of institutional quality (Finland), its banks’ share in foreign markets 
would increase by 0.1 percent when moving from a host country with the lowest 
institutional quality (Democratic Republic of Congo) to a host country with the highest 
institutional quality (Chile). This is a substantial increase considering that the mean of 
foreign presence in all host countries is 0.57 percent. In other words, banks from the best 
institutional quality source countries are willing to increase their presence by some 20 
percent if a country’s institutional quality increases from the lowest to the highest.  At the 
same time, the source country with the lowest level of institutional quality (Libya) would 
find its share in total assets of the host country drop by 0.31 percent when moving from 
the country with the lowest institutional quality to the one with the highest institutional 
quality, or a drop of more than 50 percent. For a bank from a country like Libya, 
operating in a high quality (source) country is not consistent with its competitive   13
advantage, while for a bank from a country like Finland, operating in a high quality 
(source) country is consistent with its competitive advantage. 
The coefficients of the control variables in all equations are mostly as expected. 
Colonial links between source and host country have a strong positive impact on foreign 
control. A common language, which reduces the cost of foreign banking, is a significant 
determinant for foreign bank entry, while distance is negatively related to foreign 
banking. After controlling for distance, a common border is not a significant determinant 
anymore. The fact that trade is positive and significant, indicates that banks tend to 
follow their customers. Surprisingly, differences in legal systems, which arguably 
increase the cost for a foreign bank to operate across borders, has no impact on foreign 
bank entry. The economic size of the country has a positive impact on foreign bank entry, 
possibly reflecting the importance of scale for entry.  However, the depth of the financial 
sector does not have an independent impact, which may be due to two offsetting effects.  
A well developed financial system suggests a better operating environment, also for 
foreign banks, making entry more likely. At the same time, a well developed system may 
make for fewer opportunities for foreign banks to expand into and make profits. In 
addition, depth of the financial sector might attract banks from rich countries while it 
deters banks from developing countries (see Van Horen, 2006). As expected, restrictions 
on foreign entry negatively affect the presence of foreign banks. Finally, the size and the 
income level of the source country have a positive impact on foreign banking presence.  
Summarizing, the results suggest that FDI decisions are not so much influenced 
by the absolute differences in institutional environment between source and host 
countries faced by a bank, but rather by a given bank’s ability to cope with these 
differences better than other, competitor banks. In other words, banks that are willing to 
expand their business abroad seek out those markets in which their past experience in 
working in a certain business climate gives them a competitive advantage.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
In our benchmark model we took as a measure of institutional quality the simple average 
of the six different institutional indicators. This could have biased our results since the 
average may hide the fact that competitive advantage arises with respect to a certain kind   14
of institutional indicator but does not with respect to others. Furthermore, it provides 
limited insight into the source of competitive advantage. Being familiar with working in a 
country where corruption is rampant does not necessarily make you better equipped to 
work in a country where there is, for example, political instability and violence, than a 
competitor who is not used to working in that business climate. The average measure of 
institutional quality, however, does not allow one to distinguish between the two types of 
institutional weaknesses. 
  Table 2 shows that for all individual indicators the result continues to hold that 
competitive advantage is an important determinant of the location decision of foreign 
banks. Interpreting the marginal effect of the competitive advantage variable of the 
respective indicators suggests the following. The source country with the lowest rating 
regarding voice and accountability sees a drop of 0.22 percent in the total assets it 
controls in the host country with the highest rating regarding voice and accountability as 
compared to the host country with the lowest rating. In the case of political instability and 
violence this drop is 0.19 percent, for government effectiveness and rule of law it 
amounts to 0.35 percent, while foreign control drops with respectively 0.33 and 0.28 
percent in the case of regulatory quality and control of corruption. These percentages are 
very much in line with the results we found when using the average institutional quality 
variable.   
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
The literature on foreign banking has identified several factors to influence the location 
decision of multinational banks. In this paper we add to this literature by examining 
whether the competitive advantage of one foreign bank over its competitors in a specific 
host country due to its better knowledge of the institutional environment is a determining 
factor in a bank’s decision to enter a certain market.  
  Our results suggest that it is not the level of institutional quality per se or the 
similarities in institutional quality between host and source country that have a 
determining impact on the location decision, but rather that similarities in institutions 
between host and source country as compared to the bank’s competitors determine entry   15
decisions. This implies that for those banks that compared to their competitors, are used 
to work in countries with good institutions, high institutional quality will have a positive 
impact on cross-border banking, while for banks that are more familiar with working in a 
country where institutions are weak, a worse institutional quality can be a competitive 
advantage reason to enter foreign markets.  
This result is important from a policy perspective as it shows that high 
institutional quality is not necessarily a prerequisite to be able to attract foreign direct 
investment in banking. As the development of the financial sector is an engine for growth 
in developing countries and foreign banks tend to have a beneficial impact on the 
domestic financial system, this is potentially good news for low-income developing 
countries. However, some caution is warranted for. We find that banks that can use their 
competitive advantage entering in institutionally less developed countries are more likely 
to come from other institutionally less developed countries.  This could potentially create 
costs. One cost is that these foreign banks become a source of instability in the host 
countries, for example, because they lack supervision in their source country. In addition, 
these foreign banks may take advantage of the weak institutional environment in the host 
countries and, for example, exploit the safety net provided to banks by taking on 
excessive risks.  As such, foreign banks can be immiserizing.   
As such our results suggest a further research agenda.  One area of future research 
is to investigate in more detail the source of competitive advantage. Is it that foreign 
banks from a weak institutional environment are better able to deal with a weak 
contracting environment, and can therefore easier make loans? Or is it that banks from a 
weak institutional environment are more willing to take advantage of a weak supervisory 
structure in host countries? One way to differentiate these hypotheses is to use additional 
and more specific measures of institutional differences to trace the source of competitive 
advantage. Another, complementary way is to investigate the impact of foreign banks 
entry from different countries on the financial system, especially of low-income 
countries. Neither area has yet been studied.  
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Collinks 0.652 *** 0.640 *** 0.534 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Border 0.023 0.025 0.048
[0.523] [0.492] [0.197]
Comlang 0.175 *** 0.171 *** 0.167 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Distance -0.136 *** -0.136 *** -0.121 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Trade 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.008 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
LegalDif -0.002 -0.004 -0.018
[0.901] [0.811] [0.273]
GDPhost 0.027 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
FinDepthhost -0.021 -0.020 -0.019
[0.183] [0.183] [0.181]
Entryres -0.040 ** -0.040 *** -0.037 ***
[0.013] [0.008] [0.009]
GDPsource 0.054 *** 0.054 *** 0.052 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDPcapsource 0.052 *** 0.042 *** -0.018
[0.000] [0.005] [0.303]
Dregion=East Asia and Pacific 0.410 *** 0.415 *** 0.461 ***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.002]
Dregion=Europe and Central Asia 0.209 ** 0.214 ** 0.247 **
[0.024] [0.020] [0.010]
Dregion=Latin Americ and Caribbean  0.441 *** 0.445 *** 0.431 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Dregion=Middle East and Northern Africa -0.016 -0.015 0.001
[0.773] [0.787] [0.987]
Dregion=Sub-Saharan Africa 0.519 *** 0.519 *** 0.501 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
No. Obs. 5,532 5,532 5,532
Table 1 - Competitive Advantage in Foreign Banking
(1) (2) (3)
The dependent variable is the ratio of the sum of assets of foreign banks in host country i that are owned by banks from
source country j, divided by the total amount of bank assets in host country i. Insthost is the simple average of six
indicators of quality of institutions in the host country in 2000 as measured by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005).
DiffInst is the absolute difference between quality of institutions of source and host countries. CompAdv is defined as
Insthost*(Instsource-Instcomp), see main text for explanation. Collinks is dummy which is 1 if host and source country have
had colonial links either between colonizer and colony or between those countries having been colonized by the same
colonizer. Border is dummy which is 1 if the countries share a border. Comlang is dummy which is 1 if the countries share
the same language. Distance refers to the log of the distance between the host and source countries. Trade is the log of
export plus import in 2000 between the two countries. Legaldif is a dummy which is 1 if the origin of the legal system of
host and source country differ. GDPhost is the log of the host country's GDP in 2000. FinDepthhost is the log of M2 as
percentage of GDP in the host country in 2000. Entryres is dummy which is 1 if foreign bank entry is restricted.
GDPsource and GDPcapsource are the log of respectively GDP and GDP per capita in the source country in 2000.
Dregion are dummies for each region, South-Asia is the ommited region. All regressions include a constant. Coefficients are
marginal effects. The robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of
significance respectively.
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InstIndhost -0.003 -0.006 0.010 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012
[0.828] [0.568] [0.475] [0.935] [0.816] [0.338]
CompAdvInd 0.027 *** 0.017 ** 0.041 *** 0.026 *** 0.045 *** 0.038 ***
[0.001] [0.019] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Collinks 0.650 *** 0.672 *** 0.545 *** 0.664 *** 0.498 *** 0.532 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Border 0.029 0.030 0.049 0.037 0.053 0.052
[0.428] [0.431] [0.207] [0.336] [0.144] [0.167]
Comlang 0.171 *** 0.191 *** 0.169 *** 0.168 *** 0.143 *** 0.162 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Distance -0.132 *** -0.140 *** -0.127 *** -0.131 *** -0.112 *** -0.122 ***
[0.00] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Trade 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
LegalDif -0.005 -0.005 -0.017 -0.011 -0.027 * -0.017
[0.777] [0.778] [0.309] [0.530] [0.086] [0.302]
GDPhost 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.022 *** 0.024 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
FinDepthhost -0.025 * -0.017 -0.023 -0.023 -0.013 *** -0.012
[0.092] [0.308] [0.130] [0.133] [0.346] [0.407]
Entryres -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.035 ** -0.040 ** -0.034 ** -0.037 ***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.019] [0.010] [0.007]
GDPsource 0.056 *** 0.059 *** 0.052 *** 0.056 *** 0.045 *** 0.051 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDPcapsource 0.016 0.020 -0.004 0.005 -0.015 0.005
[0.319] [0.319] [0.806] [0.761] [0.330] [0.731]
Dregion=East Asia and Pacific 0.440 *** 0.452 *** 0.455 *** 0.450 *** 0.431 *** 0.432 ***
[0.000] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Dregion=Europe and Central Asia 0.212 ** 0.239 ** 0.229 ** 0.235 ** 0.249 *** 0.247 **
[0.025] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.008] [0.010]
Dregion=Latin Americ and Caribbean  0.422 *** 0.500 *** 0.443 *** 0.429 *** 0.461 *** 0.463 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Dregion=Middle East and Northern Africa -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003
[0.899] [0.843] [0.898] [0.933] [0.978] [0.952]
Dregion=Sub-Saharan Africa 0.502 *** 0.547 *** 0.494 *** 0.517 *** 0.486 *** 0.505 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
No. Obs. 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532 5,532
(1) (2) (3)
Table 2 - Robustness test; individual indicators
(4) (5) (6)
The dependent variable is the ratio of the sum of assets of foreign banks in host country i that are owned by banks from source country j, divided by the
total amount of bank assets in host country i. InstIndhost is one of six indicators of quality of institutions in the host country in 2000 as measured by
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). In the regression (1) this is voice and accountability, in regression (2) politial instability and violence, in
regression (3) government effectiveness, in (4) regulatory quality in (5) rule of law and in the last regression InstIndhost indicates control of corruption.
CompAdvInd is defined as InstIndhost*(InstIndsource-InstIndcomp), see main text for explanation. Collinks is dummy which is 1 if host and source
country have had colonial links either between colonizer and colony or between those countries having been colonized by the same colonizer. Border is 
dummy which is 1 if the countries share a border. Comlang is dummy which is 1 if the countries share the same language. Distance refers to the log of
the distance between the host and source countries. Trade is the log of export plus import in 2000 between the two countries. Legaldif is a dummy which
is 1 if the origin of the legal system of host and source country differ. GDPhost is the log of the host country's GDP in 2000. FinDepthhost is the log of
M2 as percentage of GDP in the host country in 2000. Entryres is dummy which is 1 if foreign bank entry is restricted. GDPsource and
GDPcapsource are the log of respectively GDP and GDP per capita in the source country in 2000. Dregion are dummies for each region, South-Asia is
the ommited region. All regressions include a constant. Coefficients are marginal effects. The robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, ** and *
correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance respectively.
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Figure 1 - Simple Correlations of Institutional Quality
The figure shows the correlations between institutional quality in the host country of the foreign bank and the institutional quality in the country
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Variable Definition Source
ForCont
Insthost Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005)
DiffInst Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005)
CompAdv
Collinks CIA World Factbook (2005)
Border CIA World Factbook (2005)
Comlang CIA World Factbook (2005)
Distance CIA World Factbook (2005)
Trade UN Comtrade
LegalDif
GDPhost International Financial Statistics
FinDepthhost Log of M2 as percentage of GDP in the host country in 2000.
Entryres
GDPsource International Financial Statistics
GDPcapsource World Development Indicators
Dummy which is 1 if the countries share the same language, zero
otherwise.
The log of the distance between the host and source countries, zero
otherwise.
Log of export plus import between the source and host countries
measured in 2000.
Dummy which is 1 if the origin of the legal system of host and
source country differ, zero otherwise. 
Log of GDP in current US dollars in host country, measured in 2000
Appendix - Variable Definitions and Sources
The simple average of six indicators of quality of institutions in the
host country (voice and accountability, politial instability and
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law
and control of corruption) measured in 2000. 
The absolute difference between quality of institutions of source and
host countries measured in 2000, based on the simple average of the
absolute difference of each of the six indicators of quality of
institutions.
Ratio of the sum of assets of foreign banks in host country i that are
owned by banks from source country j, divided by the total amount
of bank assets in host country i.
Bankscope
Log of GDP per capita in current international $ in source country, 
measured in 2000
Dummy which is 1 if foreign bank entry is restricted, zero otherwise.
Foreign bank entry is considered restricted when foreign ownership
is limited to be less than 50 percent, or when no branches or
subsidiaries can be openened, or when only banks from countries
that are considered well-supervised can enter the market. Entry
restrictions are based on 2005.
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) updated
with information from several sources
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) 
and International Financial Statistics
Easterly and Sewadeh (2001) Global
Development Network Growth Database
and CIA World Factbook (2005)
International Financial Statistics
Log of GDP in current US dollars in source country, measured in
2000
Institutional quality of the host country interacted with the difference
between the institutional quality of the source country and that of the
competitors. Institutional quality of competitors is measured by
taking the weighted average (based on GDP in current dollars) of the
institutional quality of each of the possible source countries. All
variables are measured in 2000. 
Dummy which is 1 if host and source country have had colonial links
either between colonizer and colony or between those countries
having been colonized by the same colonizer after 1945, zero
otherwise.
Dummy which is 1 if the countries share a border, zero otherwise.
 